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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves an action brought on behalf of Cape 
Trust, the employees' pension and profit sharing trust for 
Capitol Thrift & Loan, against Commonwealth Land Title Insur-
ance Company, alleging that Commonwealth, acting as escrow 
agent in the sale of residential subdivision lots, negligent-
ly misrepresented to Cape Trust, the assignee of the benefi-
cial interest in certain of the lots covered by the escrow 
agreement, the status of promissory notes and second trust 
deeds on five of the subdivision lots. 
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DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried without a jury before the Honorable 
Kenneth Rigtrup, and resulted in a judgment against Common-
wealth and in favor of plaintiff Richard A. Christenson as 
trustee for Cape Trust as to plaintiff's claim for negligent 
misrepresentation. The lower court subsequently denied Com-
monwealth's post-trial motions for a new trial and/or to 
alter and amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Early in 1977, AGLA Development Corporation ("AGLA") a 
Salt Lake County based real estate developer, desired to de-
velop a residential subdivision in Salt Lake County to be 
named "Falconhurst No. l." In connection with this develop-
ment, AGLA obtained construction financing through Western 
Mortgage Loan Corporation in the amount of approximately 
$450,000.00, and as security therefor granted Western Mort-
gage Loan Corporation a deed of trust on the undeveloped sub-
division property. 
At AGLA's request, defendant Commonwealth Land Title In-
surance Company ("Commonwealth") agreed to act as escrow 
agent for the subdivision. A copy of the escrow agreement 
between AGLA and Commonwealth was introduced and received 
into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit P-2. 
-2-
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The escrow agreement between AGLA and Commonwealth pro-
vided that as the individual subdivision lots were sold, Com-
monwealth would collect and remit 60% of the proceeds of each 
sale to Western Mortgage Loan Corporation toward satisfaction 
of the $450,000.00 obligation. The escrow agreement provided 
further that if the purchaser of a subdivision lot paid the 
entire purchase price, Commonwealth would remit the remain-
der, after payment to Western Mortgage Loan Corporation, to 
AGLA or its assigns. In the event the purchaser of a lot did 
not pay the entire purchase price, the purchaser would exe-
cute a promissory note secured by a deed of trust on the sub-
division lot purchased. The notes were to provide for pay-
ment of the balance of the purchase price in full within six 
months, with interest accruing at 10% per annum until the 
date due and 18% per annum thereafter. 
Sometime in 1977 Capitol Thrift & Loan ("Capitol") made a 
loan to AGLA for which AGLA assigned its beneficial interest 
in the escrow agreement to Capitol as security (Tr. p. 32). 
It should be pointed out that plaintiff Cape Trust is the 
employee's pension and profit sharing trust for Capitol, and 
that Capitol is Cape Trust's sole contributor. 
As each lot was purchased during the period of time in 
which Capitol held the beneficial interest in the escrow 
agreement, Commonwealth, pursuant to the terms of the escrow 
-3-
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agreement, paid 60% of the proceeds to Western Mortgage Loan 
Corporation, and either remitted the remainder to Capitol or 
had promissory notes secured by trust deeds in favor of Capi-
tol executed by the purchasers for the remainder. 
Under the arrangement outlined above, in October of 1977, 
the five subdivision lots which are disputed in this action 
were purchased by Irwin Custom Hornes, Inc. Pursuant to the 
terms of the escrow agreement, Irwin Custom Homes executed 
promissory notes representing the balance of the purchase 
price which was owed to AGLA or its assigns under the escrow 
agreement. These notes were secured by trust deeds on the 
individual lots. Certified copies of the trust deeds from 
the Salt Lake County Recorder were introduced and received 
into evidence as Defendant's Exhibit D-5. 
On or about April 12, 1978, Irwin Custom Hornes, Inc., 
paid off the promissory notes on the five disputed trust 
deeds. Commonwealth then reconveyed the trust deeds (Defen-
dant's Exhibit D-5) and remitted $22,446.72 to Capitol, who 
was at that time the assignee of AGLA's beneficial interest 
in the escrow agreement. A copy of the check from Common-
wealth to Capitol which indicates on its face that it repre-
sents "lot pay-offs" on the five disputed lots, and which is 
dated April 12, 1978, was introduced and received into evi-
dence as Plaintiff's Exhibit P-4. 
-4-
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Mr. Merlyn Hanks testified at trial that in his role as 
an officer of Capitol, the check which indicated on its face 
that it represented lot pay-offs on the five disputed sub-
division lots would most likely have come to him to be nego-
tiated (Tr. pp. 13, 33). Capitol subsequently transferred 
its interest in the escrow agreement back to AGLA, probably 
because the obligation which was secured thereby had been 
satisfied. 
On October 4, 1978 AGLA assigned its beneficial interest 
in twenty-five individual subdivision lots located in the 
Falconhurst No. 1 subdivision and nine lots located in 
another development called Falconhurst No. 2 subdivision, to 
plaintiff Cape Trust, the employees' pension and profit shar-
ing trust of Capitol. The assignment, a copy of which was 
introduced and received into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibit 
P-3 was prepared by Merlyn Hanks as trustee for Cape Trust 
(Tr. p. 31). 
Mr. Hanks testified that in preparing the assignment from 
AGLA to Cape Trust he relied upon information supplied to him 
by AGLA to determine which lots should be included in the 
assignment (Tr. pp. 15-16, 17). He testified that in the 
preparation of the assignment he took no independent steps, 
nor did he make any independent effort, to-determine the 
status of the promissory notes or subdivision lots involved, 
-5-
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and he admitted that at no time did Cape Trust or Capitol 
keep a record of the promissory notes and trust deeds which 
were being paid off and reconveyed (Tr. pp. 24, 34, 35-37). 
Mr. Hanks testified that "in anticipation of" the assign-
ment he talked with Mr. Ralph Ribas of Commonwealth over the 
telephone prior to the execution of the assignment (Tr. 
pp. 31-32). During that telephone conversation specific pro-
missory notes and subdivision lots were not mentioned, nor, 
according to Mr. Hanks' testimony, was there any representa-
tion by Mr. Ribas regarding the status of any of the notes 
and subdivision lots (Tr. p. 32). 
As discussed above, it turns out that five of the twenty-
five subdivision lots in Falconhurst No. 1 subdivision 
covered by the October 4, 1978 assignment from AGLA to Cape 
Trust had already been sold to Irwin Custom Hornes, Inc., and 
the beneficial interest in the trust deeds on those five lots 
had been extinguished by the payment of the promissory notes 
by Irwin Custom Hornes to Capitol and the reconveyance of the 
trust deeds on April 12, 1978. 
Cape trust's claim of misrepresentation against Common-
wealth involves an "Acknolwedgernent" contained on the reverse 
side of the October 4, 1978 Assignment from AGLA to Cape 
Trust. The Acknowledgment, which was prepared along with the 
rest of the document by Mr. Merlyn Hanks, was signed by Ralph 
Ribas of Commonwealth. It provides: 
-6-
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Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company hereby 
acknowledges receipt of an executed copy of the fore-
going instrument and hereby promises its performance 
to satisfy said agreement. Commonwealth Land Title 
Insurance Company also agrees that it is in posses-
sion of the beneficial interest of promissory notes 
and second trust deeds covering the above-mentioned 
properties and that it will not convey its interest 
in any way back to AGLA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION or 
any other entity not covered in the escrow agreement. 
Cape Trust sued Commonwealth claiming that the Acknow-
ledgment quoted above constituted an actionable misrepresen-
tation by Commonwealth as to the status of the five disputed 
subdivision lots. Plaintiff alleged in its complaint that 
the Acknowledgment signed by Commonwealth induced Cape Trust 
to loan funds to, or for the benefit of, AGLA (Plaintiff's 
Complaint, ,15). However, Mr. Hanks testified at trial that 
the assignment was made to Cape Trust to satisfy a debt owed 
to Cape Trust by AGLA which arose out of an earlier joint 
venture between the two parties (Tr. pp. 29-30). Mr. Hanks 
testified further that he did not know whether that pre-
existing debt was fully satisfied by the assignment (Tr. 
pp. 11, 14-15}, and that the amount of debt so satisfied was 
based upon some type of present value calculation, evidence 
of which was not offered (Tr. pp. 18, 26, 30-31). 
Mr. Hanks also testified that the amount of the pre-
existing debt forgiven by the assignment probably did not 
equal the $21,680.00 prayed for in the complaint (Tr. 
-7-
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p. 27). No testimony or documentary evidence was offered by 
plaintiff to establish the amount of debt so forgiven. 
Despite the evidence summarized above, the trial court 
found that Commonwealth had made affirmative representations 
to Cape Trust regarding the status of the five disputed sub-
division lots prior to the assignment from AGLA to Cape 
Trust, which representations were confirmed by the Acknow-
ledgment signed by Mr. Ralph Ribas on behalf of Commonwealth; 
that Commonwealth knew that Cape Trust intended to rely upon 
the representations and the Acknowledgment of Commonwealth; 
that Cape Trust reasonably relied upon the representations 
and the Acknowledgment of Commonwealth; that Cape Trust had 
no knowledge of the fact that the five disputed notes had 
been paid to Capitol and the second trust deeds securing the 
notes thus reconveyed; and that the promissory notes on the 
five disputed subdivision lots, which notes were not offered 
as evidence, were for the total principal amount of 
$21,680.00, together with interest for 6 months at 10% per 
annum and thereafter at 18% per annum. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the trial court en-
tered its Conclusions of Law that Commonwealth breached a 
"special duty of care" which it owed to plaintiff by making 
representations regarding the status of the five disputed 
subdivision lots which it knew or should have known were 
-8-
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false; that plaintiff was not required to do anything to ver-
ify the truth of the representations of Commonwealth, and 
plaintiff was therefore in no way contributorily negligent; 
and that the representations and Acknowledgment of Common-
wealth materially influenced the actions of plaintiff Cape 
Trust proximately causing plaintiff damages in the amount of 
$21,680.00 together with interest at the rate of 10% per 
annum from October 7, 1977 to April 7, 1978, and thereafter 
at the rate of 18% until the date judgment was entered, and 
thereafter at 12% per annum. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT COM-
MONWEALTH MADE AN AFFIRMATIVE REPRESENTA-
TION TO CAPE TRUST REGARDING THE STATUS OF 
THE FIVE DISPUTED SUBDIVISION LOTS. 
A. There was no evidence that Commonwealth 
made any representation regarding the status of the 
five disputed subdivision lots prior to the execution 
of the October 4, 1978 Assignment and Acknowledgment. 
Plaintiff's claim against defendant Commonwealth was based 
upon a theory of misrepresentation. To prevail upon such a 
claim plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that an actual representation as to a material fact was made by 
Commonwealth to plaintiff. 
In this case the trial court found that such a representa-
tion had been made by Commonwealth to Cape Trust regarding the 
-9-
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status of the five disputed subdivision lots. However, the 
record is devoid of evidence indicating that such a representa-
tion was actually made by Commonwealth. Paragraph 7 of the 
Findings of Fact entered by the trial court reads: 
That the Acknowledgment confirmed in writing 
the same agreements and representations that had 
been previously made by Commonwealth to the 
plaintiff. 
Following the trial, the trial judge indicated that the 
telephone conversation between Merlyn Hanks and Ralph Ribas 
which was testified to by Mr. Hanks, contained the false repre-
sentation concerning the status of the five disputed subdivi-
sion lots (Tr. p. 88). The trial judge indicated his opinion 
that the Acknowledgment signed by Mr. Ribas merely confirmed 
the false representation earlier made on the telephone to Mr. 
Hanks (Id.) 
However, Mr. Ribas testified that he had no recollection of 
any telephone conversation with Mr. Hanks which had anything to 
do with the assignment of beneficial interests from AGLA to 
Cape Trust (Tr. p. 65). Further, Mr. Hanks testified that the 
only telephone conversation which he recalled with Mr. Ribas 
regarding this particular assignment of beneficial interests 
was a very general one in which nothing was said by either of 
the parties concerning any specific promissory notes, trust 
deeds or subdivision lots (Tr. p. 31-32). Thus, there was no 
-10-
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evidence to support a finding that Commonwealth made a repre-
sentation to Cape Trust in the telephone conversation between 
Mr. Ribas and Mr. Hanks. 
B. The Acknowledgement which was contained 
in the October 4, 1978 Assignment and which was 
signed by Mr. Ralph Ribas of Commonwealth cannot, 
as a matter of law, be held to constitute an 
actionable misrepresentation. 
Plaintiff presented no evidence concerning any pos-
sible representations made by Commonwealth to Cape Trust other 
than the Acknowledgment which was contained in the October 4, 
1978 Assignment and which was signed by Mr. Ribas on behalf of 
Commonwealth. Indeed, Mr. Hanks admitted during cross-examina-
tion at trial that the written Acknowledgement was the only 
"representation" which Cape Trust claimed was made by Common-
wealth regarding the status of the disputed subdivision lots 
(Tr. p. 7 0) • 
The Acknowledgement which was prepared by plaintiff and 
signed by Mr. Ribas is not, and cannot be as a matter of law, a 
representation regarding the status of the disputed subdivision 
lots. Rather, it is merely an acknowledgement and an agreement 
which was signed by Mr. Ribas after the execution of the 
Assignment. 
The Acknowledgement signed by Mr. Ribas cannot be held to 
be a representation by Commonwealth regarding the status of the 
disputed subdivision lots for two reasons. First, the Acknow-
-11-
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ledgment states that Commonwealth "acknowledges receipt of an 
executed copy" of the Assignment. Thus, since the Assignment 
had already been executed when Mr. Ribas signed the Acknowledg-
ment, even if the Acknowledgement were to be considered as a 
representation by Commonwealth, it would have been made after 
the action by plaintiff which it supposedly induced. It would 
therefore have been impossible, as a matter of law, for the 
Acknowledgement to have been a representation as to an existing 
material fact, or, as discussed in pages 13-15 below, to have 
been the proximate cause of plaintiff's loss. 
The second reason the Acknowledgement cannot be held to be 
an affirmative representation regarding the status of the dis-
puted subdivision lots is that it is couched in terms of an 
agreement, rather than as a statement or representation of cer-
tain facts. The Acknowledgement provides: 
Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company also 
agrees that it is in possession of the beneficial 
interest of promissory notes and second trust deeds 
covering the above-mentioned properties ••• 
The Assignment specifying the specific promissory notes and 
trust deeds covered thereby, and the Acknowledgment contained 
therein, were prepared by plaintiff (Tr. p. 31) and should, 
therefore, be construed against plaintiff. The Acknowledgement 
signed by Mr. Ribas was, by its own terms, merely an agreement 
with the representations made by plaintiff in the Assignment 
-12-
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regarding the status of the specific notes and trust deeds. It 
was not a statement of fact, nor was it a factual representa-
tion. The Acknowledgment cannot, as a matter of law, therefore 
be held to constitute an actionable misrepresentation. 
Since there was no evidence at trial regarding a represen-
tation made by defendant to plaintiff with respect to the sta-
tus of the five disputed subdivision lots, and since the Ack-
nowledgment signed by Mr. Ribas on behalf of Commonwealth can-
not, as a matter of law, be construed as an actionable misre-
presentation of an existing fact, the finding that Commonwealth 
made an actual representation to plaintiff regarding the status 
of the five disputed subdivision lots is erroneous and the 
judgment entered by the trial court should therefore be revers-
ed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WRONG IN ITS CONCLUSION 
OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFF REASONABLY RELIED UPON 
ANY REPRESENTATION MADE BY DEFENDANT. 
A. Plaintiff did not, as a matter of law, rely 
upon any representation made by defendant with 
respect to the status of the five disputed 
subdivision lots. 
To make out a prima facie case of negligent misrepresen-
tation, it was incumbent upon Cape Trust to prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that it actually relied upon the 
-13-
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representation of defendant Commonwealth which it claims was 
false. This principle is summarized in 37 Am.Jur.2d, Fraud 
and Deceit, § 223: 
To be actionable a representation must have been 
relied on at the time of the transaction or con-
tract. Moreover, the representation must have been 
the proximate cause of the representee's action or 
change of position -- that is, it must have been 
acted on in the manner contemplated by the party 
making it or else in some manner reasonably pro-
bable. 
Mr. Merlyn Hanks admitted on cross-examination that the 
only representation which Cape Trust claimed was made by Corn-
rnonwealth with respect to the status of the five disputed 
subdivision lots was the Acknowledgment contained in the 
October 4, 1978, Assignment (Tr. pp. 16-17, 70), which docu-
ment was drafted by Mr. Hanks (Tr. p. 31). Since the Acknow-
ledgrnent was not prepared by Commonwealth, any representation 
imputed to Commonwealth by virtue of the Acknowledgment must 
have been made by the act of Mr. Ribas in signing the Acknow-
ledgrnent. 
In this regard it is important to note the opening lan-
guage of the Acknowledgment, which states that Commonwealth 
"hereby acknowledges receipt of an executed copy of the fore-
going instrument." Thus, when the Acknowledgment was signed 
by Mr. Ribas and the "representation" of Commonwealth was 
thus made, the Assignment had already been executed. Indeed, 
at one point during direct examination Mr. Hanks referred to 
-14-
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the October 4, 1978 document as "the Assignment and subse-
quent Acknowledgment" (Tr. p. 17, line 13). The representa-
tion therefore was not, as a matter of law, "relied on at the 
time of the transaction or contract," and, consequently, was 
not an actionable representation. 
Further, the action which Cape Trust supposedly took in 
reliance upon Commonwealth's representation was the execution 
of the October 4 Assignment in satisfaction of a pre-existing 
debt owed by AGLA. However, as discussed above, this action 
had already occurred when the Acknowledgment was signed by 
Commonwealth. Therefore, the signing of the Acknowledgment 
by Commonwealth could not, as a matter of law, have been the 
proximate cause of the actions of Cape Trust or of Cape 
Trust's claimed damages. 
B. Even if Cape Trust did rely upon a repre-
sentation by Commonwealth, such reliance was un-
reasonable and unjustified on the part of Cape 
Trust. 
Even assuming that Commonwealth made an actual false re-
presentation to Cape Trust regarding the status of the five 
disputed subdivision lots, and assuming that Cape Trust's 
reliance upon such representation proximately caused it dam-
age, it is essential in a cause of action for negligent mis-
representation that the person to whom such a false represen-
tation is made reasonably and justifiably relies thereon. 
See, ~' Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(Utah 1982); Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952). It 
follows that one who has actual or constructive knowledge of 
the falsity of facts represented to him cannot justifiably 
rely upon those representations. 37 Am.Jur.2d, Fraud and 
Deceit, § 383 provides: 
There are many defenses available in an action for 
damages for fraud, some of which may be based upon 
the absence in the case of one or more of the ele-
ments essential to the maintenance of such an ac-
tion. Thus, the right of action may be negatived 
on the ground • • • that the complainant had know-
ledge, actual or constructive, of the actual 
facts. 
This general rule as it applies to fraud actions, and by 
inference to actions based upon negligent misrepresentation, 
is summarized in Section 541 of the Second Restatement of 
Torts as follows: 
The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is 
not justified in relying upon its truth if he knows 
that it is false or its falsity is obvious to him. 
In this case, Mr. Hanks, trustee for Cape Trust, and the 
one who prepared the Assignment of promissory notes and trust 
deeds from AGLA to Cape Trust, testified that in his role as 
treasurer of Capitol he would have seen and negotiated the 
April 12, 1978 check (Plaintiff's Exhibit P-4) payable to 
Capitol which specified on its face that it represented lot 
payoffs on the five disputed lots. Thus, Cape Trust had ac-
tual knowledge, imputed to it through Mr. Hanks, of the fact 
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that the five disputed trust deeds and notes which they se-
cured had been reconveyed and satisfied, and it could not 
justifiably rely upon any representations to the contrary by 
Commonwealth. 
Further, certified copies of deeds of reconveyance which 
were recorded in the Salt Lake County Recorder's office on 
the five disputed subdivision lots were introduced and re-
ceived into evidence as Defendant's Exhibit D-5. These re-
conveyances were of record in the County Recorder's office at 
the time the assignment from AGLA to Cape Trust was prepared 
by Mr. Hanks and executed. Utah Code Annotated § 57-3-2, 
provides: 
Every conveyance, or instrument in writing affect-
ing real estate, executed, acknowledged or proved, 
and certified, in the manner prescribed by this 
title ••• shall, from the time of filing the same 
with the recorder for record, impart notice to all 
persons of the contents thereof: ••• 
Cape Trust therefore had constructive knowledge of the fact 
that the trust deeds on the five disputed subdivision lots 
had been reconveyed prior to the preparation and execution of 
the Assignment, and it could not, therefore, justifiably rely 
upon representations by Commonwealth to the contrary. 
Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, supra, was an action 
for the misrepresentation of the square footage in a house. 
In Mikkelson the defendant, a real estate agent, listed a 
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house for sale indicating that it contained 2800 square 
feet. The house was purchased by the plaintiff, and an FHA 
appraisal was obtained which indicated that the square foot-
age was actually 2,394 square feet. The plaintiff signed the 
closing documents after having acknowledged receipt of the 
FHA appraisal information. 
In preparing to sell the house one year later, the plain-
tiff measured the square footage and discovered the discre-
pancy. The trial court found an actionable misrepresentation 
on the part of the defendant real estate agent and awarded 
damages to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed the 
lower court, holding that the plaintiff did not reasonably 
rely upon the representation of defendant as to the square 
footage of the house. The court stated, at page 126: 
The undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff 
could not have reasonably relied on his belief that 
the house contained 2800 square feet since he not 
only inspected the property but also signed, prior 
to closing, loan documents acknowledging receipt of 
the FHA appraisal report wherein the correct foot-
age was revealed. Furthermore, on cross-examina-
tion, plaintiff admitted that he had in his file 
and possession a copy of the form containing the 
correct figure. While plaintiff may have initially 
received false information, he cannot reasonably 
continue to rely on it once true and correct infor-
mation is furnished him, particularly when the cor-
rected information is contained in a document of 
the importance and dignity of an appraisal and re-
lated forms. 
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As in the Mikkelson case, Mr. Hanks here testified that 
he most likely saw and negotiated the check which indicated 
on its face that it represented lot pay-offs on the five dis-
puted subdivision lots prior to preparing the Assignment of 
the beneficial interests which contained those five subdivi-
sion lots (Tr. pp. 13,33). Cape Trust was, therefore, not 
justified as a matter of law in relying upon any representa-
tion by Commonwealth regarding the status of the five dis-
puted subdivision lots where it knew, or should have known, 
of the true status of those lots. 
In Lewis v. White, 269 P.2d 865 (Utah 1954), the plain-
tiff sued to forfeit a real estate contract and retake pos-
session of a motel. The defendants filed a counterclaim al-
leging that in connection with the sale of the motel the 
plaintiff misrepresented the motel's gross income. The trial 
court ruled in favor of the defendants on the misrepresenta-
tion issue. 
In the Lewis case, despite the fact that the defendants 
were naive and were entirely without business experience, and 
were relying upon the plaintiff's knowledge and expertise as 
a real estate broker and motel operator, the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court's ruling on the misrepresenta-
tion issue. The Supreme Court held, at page 866: 
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In submitting the question of fraud it was incum-
bent upon the trial court to instruct the jury as 
to the elements necessary to establish it. Plain-
tiffs point out that he failed to do this in that 
he did not tell them that in order to establish 
their claim of fraud defendants must have reason-
ably relied upon the representations they claim the 
plaintiff made to them. This is invariably held to 
be an element necessary to make out a case of 
fraud. No matter how naive or inexperienced the 
defendants were, they could not close their eyes 
and accept unquestioningly any representations made 
to them. It was their duty to make such investiga-
tion and inquiry as reasonable care under the cir-
cumstances would dictate. [Emphasis in original] 
See, also, Kohler v. Garden City, 639 P.2d 162 {Utah 
1981); and Jardine v. Brunswick Corporation, 423 P.2d 659 
{Utah 1967) , in which the Utah Supreme Court held: 
One who complains of being injured by such a 
false representation cannot heedlessly accept as 
true whatever is told him, but has the duty of 
exercising such degree of care to protect his 
own interests as would be exercised by an ordi-
nary, reasonable and prudent person under the 
circumstances; and if he fails to do so, is pre-
cluded from holding someone else to account for 
the consequences of his own neglect. 
The undisputed evidence at trial established that plain-
tiff Cape Trust had actual and constructive knowledge of the 
fact that the five disputed promissory notes and trust deeds 
had been satisfied and reconveyed prior to the assignment of 
those notes and trust deeds from AGLA to Cape Trust. Cape 
Trust was therefore not justified, as a matter of law, in 
relying upon any contrary representations made by Common-
wealth. Further, plaintiff Cape Trust was not justified in 
-20-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
blindlessly and heedlessly accepting as true anything which 
Commonwealth might have represented concerning the disputed 
lots. 
POINT III 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES TO CAPE TRUST. 
A. The $21,680 awarded as damages was unsupported 
by competent evidence, and was wrong as a matter of law. 
Following trial the court awarded plaintiff damages in 
the amount of $21,680 plus interest at the rate of 10% per 
annum from October 7, 1977 to April 7, 1978 and 18% interest 
thereafter until the date of judgment. This award of damages 
was excessive as a matter of law, and was not supported by 
the evidence. 
Mr. Merlyn Hanks testified that the amount of debt owed 
by AGLA which was forgiven by Cape Trust in return for the 
assignment of the beneficial interest in the promissory notes 
and trust deeds on the disputed lots was based upon some type 
of present value formula or analysis (Tr. pp. 18, 26, 
30-31) • There was no testimony or evidence offered to ex-
plain the present value formula or analysis so used. 
Mr. Hanks testified on cross-examination that the present 
value formula utilized by Cape Trust resulted in some dis-
counting of the face value of the promissory notes involved 
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(Tr. p. 27). However, Mr. Hanks did not testify as to the 
amount of discounting which occurred. Indeed, he testified 
on cross-examination that a calculation of the discounting 
which occurred could not be made from the evidence in the 
record: 
Q. So you applied the present value of the 
face amount of 40% of whatever the lot prices 
were? 
A. Not the present value of the face amount. The 
present value of the anticipated payoff. 
Q. From the date the notes bore? 
A. Yes. To the date that we anticipated they 
would payoff. 
Q. Well, what was the date you anticipated they 
would payoff? 
A. Without that document that I referred to hav-
ing received from AGLA, I can't give you that 
date. It was different, however, than the date of 
the maturity because AGLA Development, in its re-
lationship with the builders, you know, to whom 
they had sold the lots wanted us to be a little 
more lenient with the time than the notes called 
for. That's why it took some additional calcula-
tion to determine what the anticipated amount would 
be. 
Q. So without some further evidence in the record 
you can't specifically tell us what date you util-
ized in your present value calculations in order to 
determine the amount that was actually credited 
against the AGLA debt; is that correct? 
A. That's right. 
Transcript, pages 30-31. 
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Mr. Hanks testified further under cross-examination 
that the $21,680 prayed for in the complaint represent-
ed the face value of the notes, not taking into account 
the discounting which occurred (Tr. p. 27). Thus, he 
testified that the actual amount of damages sustained 
by Cape Trust was not the amount prayed for in the com-
plaint. There was no testimony or evidence regarding 
the amount of damage actually sustained by plaintiff. 
Further, paragraph 14 of the Findings of Fact en-
tered by the court, upon which the award of damages was 
based, states: 
That the five promissory notes the Trust Deeds on 
Lots 12, 18, 30, 34 and 53, Falconhurst Subdivision 
No. 1, were all executed October 7, 1977 and the 
original total principal amount of the five notes 
was the sum of $21,680, together with interest for 
six months at 10% per annum and thereafter at 18% 
per annum. 
Mr. Hanks was allowed to testify regarding the terms of 
the promissory notes despite objections by defendant under 
Rule 70 of the Utah Rules of Evidence that the best evidence 
of the terms of the notes would be the notes themselves, 
which were not offered as evidence (Tr. p. 19). Since the 
testimony contained in the transcript on pages 20-23 concern-
ing the terms and contents of the disputed promissory notes 
should not have been admitted because of the Best Evidence 
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Rule, the award of damages based upon such testimony was 
error and cannot stand as a matter of law. 
B. The pre-judgment interest awarded plain-
tiff by the trial court was unsupported by the evi-
dence, and was wrong as a matter of law since it 
represented special damages which were neither 
pleaded nor proved by plaintiff. 
The pre-judgment interest awarded by the trial court is 
also clearly in error. There was no contract between plain-
tiff and defendant which provided for the interest rate 
awarded by the court. There is no Utah statute which autho-
rizes such an award of interest. 
The amount of interest which was awarded to plaintiff is 
an element of special damages. See, Cohn v. J. c. Penney 
Company, Inc., 537 P.2d 306 (Utah 1975). As such, it was 
error to award that amount of interest since it was not spe-
cially pleaded or prayed for by plaintiff. Special damages, 
in order to be awarded, must be specifically pleaded and 
prayed for by plaintiff Id. The prayer of plaintiff's com-
plaint reads: 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays judgment against Common-
wealth and AGLA, jointly and severally, in the a-
mount of $21,680, together with interest thereon 
from the date such funds were paid by Commonwealth 
to others to the date of judgment herein, and for 
plaintiff's costs incurred herein. 
It is clear that plaintiff did not plead nor pray for the 
special rate of interest which was awarded. 
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Not only did plaintiff not plead or pray for the special 
interest award, but plaintiff failed to prove by competent 
evidence that it was entitled to such an award of interest. 
Indeed, the only evidence at trial indicating that plaintiff 
suffered a loss of the specified amount of interest awarded 
was the testimony by Mr. Hanks concerning the terms of pro-
missory notes which were not introduced into evidence. As 
discussed above, such testimony should have been excluded 
based upon the Best Evidence Rule. Thus, the interest award-
ed was wrong as a matter of law, and was totally unsupported 
by admissible evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in finding that Commonwealth made 
an affirmative representation to Cape Trust regarding the 
status of the five disputed subdivision lots, and in finding 
that Cape Trust reasonably relied upon any possible represen-
tation of Commonwealth. The trial court further erred in 
awarding Cape Trust an amount of damages which finds no sup-
port in the evidence and which plaintiff admitted was not the 
amount of damages actually sustained by plaintiff, and in 
awarding plaintiff a pre-judgment rate of interest which re-
presents an award of special damages which was neither 
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pleaded nor proved by plaintiff. It is therefore respectful-
ly submitted that the judgment of the trial court should be 
reversed and judgment should be entered in favor of defen-
dant, Commonwealth ~d Title Insurance Company. 
DATED this /3 day of May, 1982. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant/ 
Appellant Commonwealth Land 
Title Insurance Company 
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